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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

Defendant-Appellant will be called "Griffith".
Respondent will be called "Dresser".

Plaintiff-

Commercial Security Bank

will be called "CSB."

ISSUES
1.

Whether funds belonging to a corporation but held in a

bank account listed under the name of an individual may be
garnished by a judgment creditor of the individual.
2.

Whether the funds garnished by Dresser belonged to Modern

Equipment Company, a corporation, or Griffith, Dresser's judgment
debtor.
3.

Whether CSB should be estopped to assert in its answers

to Dresser's garnishee interrogatories that the funds in the
Modern Equipment's account belonged to Griffith.
4.

Whether Dresser should be estopped to invoke garnishment

remedies because of improprieties in its efforts to collect its
judgment against Griffith.
5.

If the garnished funds are found to be personal, whether

Dresser's entitlement thereto is subject to Rule 64D's limitation
on garnishment of earnings from personal service.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action concerns the propriety of Dresser's garnishment
of funds which Griffith contends belong to a nonjudgment debtor
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corporate on.
On September 2, 1986, Dresser garnished a CSB checking
account in an effort to satisfy a judgment it had obtained on
July 23, 1986 against Griffith.

Griffith, contending that the

funds in the account belonged to a business which had been
incorporated on July 11, 1986, objected to the garnishment and
moved the district court to set it aside.

The District Court

held a brief evidentiary hearing, took the matter under
advisement and later denied Griffith's motion to set aside the
garnishment and garnishee judgment.
RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION
IS DETERMINATIVE
The following portions of Rule 64D of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure are relevant to issues raised in this appeal:
(d)

Issuance of Writ.
* * * * * * * * *

(ii) After the entry of a judgment requiring the payment of
money, the clerk of any court from which execution thereon may be
issued shall issue a writ or writs of garnishment, without the
necessity for an undertaking, upon the filing of an affidavit of
the judgment creditor: (a) identifying the person sought to be
charged as a garnishee: (b) stating that the personal property
sought to be garnished is non-exempt; and (c) stating whether
such property consists in whole or part of earnings from personal
services as hereinafter defined in (e) (iv) of this Rule.
Several writs may be issued at the same time and the names of as
many persons as are sought to be charged as garnishees may be
inserted in the same writ or different writs.
(e) Content and Effect of Writ - To Whom Directed.
(i) The writ of garnishment shall be issued in the name of
the state of Utah and shall be directed to the person or persons
designated in the plaintiff's affidavit as garnishee or
garnishees, advising each such person that he is attached as
garnishee in the action, and commanding him not to pay any debt
due or to become due to the defendant which is not exempt from
execution and to retain possession and control of all credits,
chattels, goods, effects, debts, choses in action, money and
-2-

persona] property and rights to property of such defendant not
exempt from execution until further order of the court.
(ii) The writ may further require the garnishee to answer
interrogatories within ]0 days from the date of service of the
writ; provided that no garnishee shall be required to answer such
interrogatories unless and until he is paid or tendered a fee of
$3.00 for so doing. The interrogatories may in substance
i nquire:
(1) whether the garnishee is indebted to the defendant,
either in property or in money, whether the same is now due
and if not when it is to become due; (2) whether the
garnishee has in his possession, in his charge, or under his
control any credits, chattels, goods, effects, debts, choses
in action, money or other personal property of the defendant,
or in which the defendant is interested; and if so, the value
of the same; (3) whether the garnishee knows of any debts
owing to the defendant, whether due or not, or of any
credits, chattels, goods, effects, debts, choses in action,
money or other personal property belonging to the defendant
or in which defendant is interested, whether in the
possession or under the control of the garnishee or another,
and if so, the particulars thereof; (4) as to any other
pertinent information that plaintiff may desire, including
defendant's job, position or occupation, his rate and method
of compensation, his pay period and the computation of the
amount of his accrued disposable earnings attached by the
writ.
(iii) A writ of garnishment attaching earnings for personal
services shall attach that portion of the defendant's accrued and
unpaid disposable earnings, hereinafter specified. The writ
shall so advise the garnishee and shall direct the garnishee to
whithhold from the defendant's accrued disposable earnings the
amount attached pursuant to the writ and to pay the exempted
amount to the defendant at the time his earnings are normally
paid. Earnings for personal services shall be deemed to accrue
on the last day of the period in which they were earned or to
which they relate. If the writ is served before or on the date
the defendant's earnings accrue and before the same have been
paid to the defendant, the writ shall be deemed to have been
served at the time the periodic earnings accrue; and if more than
one writ is served, the writ first served shall have priority.
(iv) "Earnings" or "earnings from personal services" means
compensation paid or payable for personal services, whether
denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise,
and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or
retirement program. "Disposable earnings" means that part of a
defendant's earnings remaining after the deduction of all amounts
required by law to be withheld.
(v)

The maximum portion of the aggregate disposable earnings
-3-

of an individual becoming due any individual which are subject to
garnishment is the lesser of:
(a) Twenty-five per centum of defendant's disposable
earning for that week; or
(b) The amount by which defendant's aggregate
disposable earnings computed for that week exceeds forty
times the federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by the Fair
Labor Standards Act in effect at the time the earnings are
payable;
(c) In the case of earnings for a pay period other than
a week, the amount of disposable earnings shall be the amount
prescribed by the administrator of the Utah Uniform Consumer
Credit Code under the authority of Section 70B-5-105, U.C.A.,
1953, as amended.
(vi) Unless a garnishee is specifically informed by affidavit
of the plaintiff that the defendant has other periodic earnings
from sources other than from the garnishee and the amount
thereof, the garnishee shall treat the defendant's earnings
becoming due from the garnishee as the defendant's entire
aggregate earnings for the purpose of computing the sum attached
by the garnishment.

-4-

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On July 11, 1986, Modern Equipment Company was incorporated.
(Exhibit 4, Record 131). For several years prior to that time,
Griffith had done business under the assumed name of Modern
Equipment Company.

The business was incorporated in order to

infuse needed capital into the business through the majority
shareholdership of Kyoko Oshiro, an oriental woman (Record 26,
135) -1
On the day of incorporation, the Board of Directors adopted a
resolution designating the Murray Branch of Commercial Security
Bank ("CSB") as the depository of corporate funds (Exhibit 5,
Record 132-3).

On or about that day, Griffith notified David

Green, an officer and agent of CSB at the Murray Branch, of
Modern Equipment's incorporation and of the fact that the funds
in Modern Equipment's account were and from then on would be
"corporate" funds (Record 26-7, 135-6, 140). At that time, the
account contained 3,669.59 (Record 133).
Twelve days after Modern Equipment was incorporated—on July
23, 1986—Dresser obtained a default judgment in this action
against Griffith in the amount of $13,848.81 (Record 8).
On August 7, 1986, Griffith was served with a Motion and
Order in Supplemental Proceedings directing him to appear in
court on August 19, 1986.

(Record 9). Because of a conflicting

it was believed that Joans and government contracts would be
more accessible to the Company upon its becoming a "minorities
corporation". Thus, the aim of the incorporation was to help the
business meet, not defeat, debts owed to its suppliers. (Record
26, 135)
-5-

pre-existing dental appointment, Griffith made arrangements
through his counsel to appear in the office of Dresser's attorney
at another time rather than appear in court on August 19.
(Record 27, 136-7).
Griffith voluntarily appeared at the agreed time and answered
questions put to him by Mr. Pau] Van Dyke, a partner of Dresser's
counsel of record.

During this meeting, Mr. Van Dyke indicated

that he would recommend to Dresser the acceptance of $1,000.00
per month as payment on the unsatisfied judgment.

Griffith asked

for time to make certain he could meet such a commitment.

He

understood that he could have three weeks to get back to Mr. Van
Dyke with confirmation of his ability to meet the proposed
arrangement.

This meeting took place within a few days after

August 19, 1986.

(Record 28, 137-8).

On September 2, 1986, Mr. Van Dyke's partner, Stephen B.
Elggren, caused a Writ of Garnishment to be served on CSB.
(Record 3 9-20)
$34,391.34.

At that time, the garnished account contained

(Record 133, 146).

The funds in the account at the time of garnishment included
two large deposits made on August 27 and August 28, 1986
reflecting funds received from Projects Unlimited and Beneco.
(Record 133-134).

Such deposits represented payment for material

and labor provided by Modern Equipment Company between mid July
and mid August, 1986.

(Record 134). At the time such material

and labor were provided, Modern Equipment was a corporation, not
a sole proprietorship of Griffith.

(Record 131, Exhibit 4). The

amount of the Projects Unlimited and Beneco deposits were
-6-

$12,462.00 and $28,647.40, respectively.

(Record 69-72).

When Griffith contested the propriety of Dresser's
garnishment of the CSB account, thie matter was scheduled for an
evidentiary hearing before Judge Sawaya on the morning of October
2, 1986, before his other scheduled matters.

(Record 125).

After taking evidence on that morning, Judge Sawaya indicated he
had no further time and requested counsel to supply him with
written memoranda on the issues presented.

He asked for the

submission of memoranda by both counsel within ten days of the
hearing.
Prior to submission of Griffith's memorandum and before the
expiration of the ten day time limit, Judge Sawaya issued a
minute entry (dated October 9) deciding the matter in favor of
Dresser (Record 46). When Griffith's counsel learned that such a
ruling had been made without the Court having considered
counsel's memorandum (which he believed cited dispositive law in
Griffith's favor), he objected to entry of the Order.

(Record

47-8)
On October 27, 1986, a hearing was held in which Judge Sawaya
acknowledged his error in having ruled prematurely.

He refused

to hear oral argument at that time, indicating he would
reconsider his decision after reading counsels' memoranda.
(Record 158-161).
On December 1, 1986—some two months after the brief
evidentiary hearing concerning ownership of the garnished funds—
Judge Sawaya signed his final Order denying Griffith's motion to
set aside the garnishment and garnishee judgment.
-7-

The express

basis of his Order was:
The facts of the Peterson case and the present
case are distinguishable in that there is no
proof that the funds in the present case were
generated by nor payable to the corporation.
Based thereon, the Court affirms its previous
decision. ... (Record 113)
Following Judge Sawaya's first, premature ruling, CSB
delivered the garnished funds (some $14,070.85) to Dresser's
counsel.

When this came to light, Judge Sawaya ordered that such

funds be deposited into court into an interest bearing account
pending the outcome of this appeal.

(Record 115-116).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Under this Court's ruling in Peterson v. Peterson, 571

P.2d 1360 (Utah 1977), the ownership of funds, not the ownership
of the account in which they are found, determines
garnishability.
2.

The funds garnished by Dresser did not belong to

Griffith, Dresser's judgment debtor, but belonged to Modern
Equipment Company, a Utah corporation.
3.

CSB should be estopped to assert in its garnishee

interrogatory answers that the funds belonged to Griffith because
Griffith had informed CSB at the time of Modern Equipment's
incorporation (weeks before the judgment against Griffith was
entered) that the funds in the account were corporate funds.
(Record 26-7, 135-6)
4.

Dresser should be estopped to proceed on the garnishment

by reason of Griffith's reasonable reliance on the indication of
Dresser's counsel that collection efforts would be held in
-8-

abeyance pending final commitment to a proposed payment
arrangement and because of other post-judgment improprieties
committed in aid of the questioned garnishment.
5.

If the Court finds the funds to be Griffith's money, it

should limit garnishment to that portion of the funds garnishable
under Rule 64D as earnings from personal services,

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE OWNERSHIP OF FUNDS, NOT THE OWNERSHIP
OF THE ACCOUNT IN WHICH THEY ARE FOUND,
DETERMINES GARN1SHABILITY
In Peterson v. Peterson, 571 P.2d 1360 (Utah 1977) this Court
was asked to rule on the propriety of

a garnishment execution.

In that case, the plaintiff had garnished a bank account which
was admittedly held in the sole name of the defendant,
plaintiff's ex-husband.

Although only defendant's name was on

the bank's signature card and he was, therefore, the only person
authorized to write checks against the account, there was
evidence that the funds in the account were derived almost
exclusively from paychecks of defendant's wife.
This Court affirmed the district court's setting aside of the
garnishment execution.

In doing so, it noted the existence of

relevant rulings in several cases concerning joint tenancy bank
accounts.

See, e.g., Beehive State Bank v. Rosquist, 21 Utah 2d

17, 439 P.2d 468 (1968).

In Beehive, this Court held that the

funds in a joint tenancy bank account are not subject to
garnishment by a judgment creditor of one of the account holders
-9-

if the judgment debtor has no equitable interest in the funds*
This Court also noted that virtually all other jurisdictions are
in accord with that rule.

See 30 AmJur 2d, Executions, §800 and

11 ALR 3rd 1473.
The Peterson case, like this case, did not pertain to a joint
tenancy account.

However, this Court found "still there is a

sufficient analog" Lo make the holdings in the joint tenancy
cases persuasive.

In Poterson, there was evidence that the money

in the defendant's account "belonged" to his wife.

The money was

used, however, for defendant's child support payments to the
plaintiff (his former wife), as well as for his and his current
wife's general living expenses.

Even though the defendant

withdrew money from the account for his personal obligations,
both he and his wife considered the money to be hers. Based on
these facts, the district court found and this Court affirmed
that the money was not subject to garnishment for the defendant's
debts.
The facts supporting immunity from garnishment in this case
are stronger than the facts in Peterson.

Here, the account was

considered to be the account of Modern Equipment Company, a
corporation.

Unlike the Peterson case, there is no evidence that

Griffith withdrew money from the account for his personal
obligations.

Griffith did not treat the money as his own, but

treated it as corporation money from which corporation debts were
to be paid.

(Record 27). The fact that the signature card

covering the account had not been changed to reflect the
incorporation is not dispositive.
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The ownership of the funds,

not the ownership of the account, determines garnishability.
Peterson, supra.

POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN IGNORING
INCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE THAT THE FUNDS
IN THE GARNISHED ACCOUNT WERE GENERATED
BY AND PAID TO AN ENTITY OTHER THAN
DRESSER'S JUDGMENT DEBTOR
At the time of incorporation, the account contained $3,669.59
(Record 133). When it was garnished two months later, it
contained $34,391.34 (Record 133, 146). On August 27, 1986, the
sum of $28,647.40 was deposited into that account from a payment
made to the corporation by Beneco.

(Record 71-72, 134). The

following day, a deposit of $12,462.00 was made into the account
from a payment to the corporation from Projects Unlimited.
(Record 69-70, 134). Both the Beneco and Projects Unlimited
checks were for payment of labor and materials provided by
Modern Equipment between the middle of July and the middle of
August—after its incorporation.

(Record 134). This evidence

was evidently overlooked, ignored or forgotten by the district
court when it found as the basis for its denial of Griffith's
Motion to Set Aside the Garnishment
that there is no proof that the funds in the
present case were generated by nor payable to
the corporation. (Record 113).
On the contrary, there is no evidence that the garnished funds
were generated by or payable to anybody except Modern Equipment
Company, the corporation.
As the Court stated in Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v.
-11-

Slayton, 407 F.2d 1078 (8th Cir. 1969):
It is elementary that a corporation is an
entity separate and distinct from its
stockholders and that earnings of a
corporation remain the property of the
corporation until severed and distributed as
dividends and that a corporation cannot be
required to pay obligations which are not its
own but those of some of its stockholders.
407 F.2d at 1082.
This Court's opinion in Peterson v. Peterson, supra, mandates
the release of plaintiff's garnishment.

POINT III
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL BARS CSB
FROM ASSERTING IN ITS GARNISHEE INTERROGATORY
ANSWERS THAT THE FUNDS IN THE ACCOUNT BELONGED
TO GRIFFITH
Silence or acquiescence when one has knowledge of facts or
circumstances which he should disclose will establish the basis
for an equitable estoppel.

Zeese v. Estate of Siegel, 534 P.2d

85, 89 (Utah 1975); Jenkins v. Nicolas, 226 P. 177, 182 (Utah
1924) .
When Griffith informed Mr. Green at CSB of the incorporation
of Modern Equipment Company and that the account at CSB would be
used for the corporation's business, Mr. Green's acquisition of
such knowledge became imputable to CSB.

Knowledge by an agent or

officer will charge a bank with knowledge of the special nature
of deposited funds.

White v. Pioneer Bank and Trust Co., 298P.

933, 935 (Idaho 1931).

This imputed knowledge is sufficient to

satisfy the knowledge requirement of estoppel by silence.
Ackerman, 51 N.W.2d 87, 93 (Minn. 1952).
-12-

May v.

A bank deals with funds of its depositors as a fiduciary.
Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. Taylor, 384 P.2d 796f 801 (Utah
1963).

With knowledge that the business had been incorporated

and that the funds in the CSB account belonged to the
corporation, the bank owed Griffith the duty to at least inform
him that the ownership of the account was still in his name
personally and ought to be changed.

Having remained silent, CSB

should be precluded from asserting in its garnishee interrogatory
answers (Record 23) that the funds were Griffith's and therefore
subject to involuntary alienation by Griffith's personal
creditors.
He who is silent when conscience
requires him to speak shall be
debarred from speaking when
conscience requires him to keep
silent.
Clark v. Kirby, 55 P. 372, 374 (Utah 1898)
No one at the bank told Griffith that the account signature
card needed to be changed.

In the absence of receipt of such

information, Griffith allowed corporate funds to be deposited into
the account.

Had Griffith realized that CSB would subject the

account to claims of his creditors, he undoubtedly would not have
deposited into that account the checks paid to the corporation in
late August.

Great detriment has resulted both to Griffith and to

Modern Equipment Company as a result of Griffith's reasonable
reliance on CSB's agent, David Green.
-13-

(Record 27, 139).

POINT IV
DRESSER SHOULD BE ESTOPPED TO RECOVER ON THE
GARNISHMENT BY REASON OF ITS DEBT COLLECTION
IMPROPRIETIES
This Court has stated that estoppel
is a doctrine of equity to prevent one party from
deluding or inducing another into a position where
he will unjustly suffer loss... [T]he test is
whether there is conduct, by act or is conduct, by
act or omission, by which one party knowingly leads
another party, reasonably acting thereon, to take
some course of action, which will result in his
detriment or damage if the first party is permitted
to repudiate or deny his conduct or
misrepresentation
J.P. Koch, Inc., v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 534 P.2d 905 (Utah
1975) .
In addition to equitable estoppel, the doctrine of
promissory estoppel is recognized in this jurisdiction as stated
at §90(1) of the Restatement Second of Contracts, quoted
approvingly in Southeastern Equipment Co. v. Mauss, 696 P.2d 1187
(Utah 1985) at 1188:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably
expect to induce action or forbearance on the part
of the promisee or a third person and which does
induce such action or forbearance is binding if
injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise.
A third doctrine often invoked by courts where the exact
requirements of equitable or promisory estoppel have not been met
is judicial estoppel.

This doctrine admittedly "of rather vague

outline" has been used by courts frequently in order to prevent a
litigant from "playing fast and loose with the judicial process".
1 B Moore, Federal Practice, §405(8) at 239 (2d Ed. 1978).

See

Scarano v. New Jersey Central Railroad, 203 F 2d 510 (3rd Cir. 1953).
-14-

Griffith submits that one or more of these doctrines should be
applied against Dresser.
Griffith appeared before Dresser's counsel and honestly and
forthrightly answered all questions put to him.

He reasonably

relied on the indication of Mr. Van Dyke that he could have three
weeks to determine his ability to meet a proposed payment
schedule.

It was his reasonable assumption and belief that no

adverse action would be taken against him in the interim.
The failure to forbear appears to have been a result of lack
of communication between Plaintiff's attorneys.

Mr. Van Dyke did

not appear at the hearing in which the garnishment was contested.
It may be inferred from his nonappearance that Griffith's
understanding was accurate, and that his reliance on that
understanding was reasonable.
Twelve days after his meeting with Mr. Van Dyke, Van Dyke's
partner garnished the subject bank account without any prior
notice to Griffith or his counsel.

Had Griffith realized the

business account would be at risk, he would not have deposited the
checks paid to the corporation in late August.

Great detriment

has come to Griffith and to Modern Equipment Company as a result
of Griffith's reliance on Mr. Van Dyke's indication of
forbearance.

(Record 27).

It is apparent that Mr. Van Dyke and Mr. Elggren did not
communicate with each other concerning arrangements to collect the
Griffith judgment.

This is blatantly apparent from the fact that

after Griffith came to Mr. Van Dyke's office by stipulation in
lieu of appearing in Court on the Supp. Order, Mr. Elggren caused
an Order to Show Cause to be issued and served upon Griffith
-15-

commanding him to explain his nonappearance at the scheduled
hearing, at peril of being held in contempt of Court.

(Record

33-35) .
Interestingly, the Order to Show Cause was issued the day
after issuance of the questioned Writ of Garnishment.
24).

(Record

The Writ presumably was based on information obtained in Mr.

Van Dyke's interview with Griffith a few days earlier.
Griffith testified that he had no contact with any legal
representative of Dresser except Mr. Van Dyke (Record 139). The
affidavit in support of garnishment, however, was signed by Mr.
Ellgren.

(Record 15).

It avers that "the property sought to be

garnished does not consist,in whole or in part, of earnings from
personal service."

(Record 15).

There is uncontroverted testimony that deposits in the CSB
account included payments for "labor".

(Record 134).

If Dresser

is correct in its contention that the money in the account is
Griffith's, then it is blatantly incorrect in its affidavit for
garnishment and in its assertion of entitlement to the funds in
the account.
Under Rule 64D(e)(v), only 25% of the defendant's disposable
earnings may be attached.

Dresser's counsel employed the wrong

Garnishment form and improperly sought garnishment of an entire
fund only part of which, if any, was legally garnishable.

(See

argument V, infra).
In sum, the record is rife with improprieties committed in
furtherance of the questioned garnishment.

Principles of

equitable and promissory estopel should bar Dresser from
-16-

garnishing the CSB account after inducing Griffith's reliance on
Mr. Van Dyke's indication of forbearance.

Judicial estoppel should

be invoked to discountenance Dresser's inconsistent assertions
with respect to the nature of the funds in the garnished account
and to discountenance its otherwise "playing fast and loose with
the Judicial process."

Scarano, supra.

POINT V
IF THE COURT FINDS THE GARNISHED
FUNDS BELONG TO GRIFFITH,
DRESSER'S ENTITLEMENT THERETO
IS SUBJECT TO RULE 64D's
LIMITATION ON GARNISHMENT
OF EARNINGS FROM PERSONAL SERVICE
This Court may take judicial notice of the fact that there are
in common use among lawyers two forms of garnishment writs. One
form is used for the attachment of earnings from personal
services.
funds.

The other is used for the attachment of all other

The printed garnishee interrogatories appearing on these

two forms differ.
The form writ for the garnishment of earnings contains
interrogatories and calculation instructions based on the
provisions of Rule 64D(e) iii, iv and v.

These provisions limit

the judgment creditor to the attachment of no more than 25% of the
defendant's disposable income or, under some circumstances, even
less than that.
A condition precedent to the court clerk's issuance of an
appropriate writ is the judgment creditor's filing of an affidavit
meeting the requirements of Rule 64D(d)(ii).
-17-

In this case, the judgment creditor's affidavit was signed by
an attorney who had had no personal contact with the judgment
debtor (Record 139) and whose personal knowledge of the averments
made therein must therefore be viewed with suspicion.
The affidavit avers that the account to be garnished is
"non-exempt" and "does not consist, in whole or in part, of
earnings from personal service".

(Record 15).

At the hearing contesting the garnishment, Dresser offered
testimony through a CSB "branch administration support specialist"
that at the time of the garnishment, the signature card for
the Modern Equipment account (signed January 10, 1975) was a
"proprietor card" indicating Griffith to be the proprietor of the
Company.

(Record 20, 22).

Griffith testified that Modern Equipment had only one account
(Record 140) and that payments for services were deposited into
that account.

(Record 134).

If the funds in that account belong

to Griffith, such funds constitute his "earnings", as the alleged
proprietor of the business.

Attachment of such earnings is

limited by the provisions of Rule 64D.
Assuming, as Dresser contends, the funds in the CSB account
were personal, Dresser may attach no greater portion of such funds
that allowed under Rule 64D(e)(v), which provides:
(v) The maximum portion of the aggregate disposable
earnings of an individual becoming due any
individual which are subject to garnishment is the
lesser of:
(a) Twenty-five per centum of defendant's disposable
earning for that week; or
-18-

(b) The amount by which defendant's aggregate
disposable earnings computed for that week exceeds
forty times the federal minimum hourly wage
prescribed by the Fair Labor Standards Act in effect
at the time the earnings are payable;
(c) In the case of earnings for a pay period other than
a week, the amount of disposable earnings shall be the
amount prescribed by the administrator of the Utah Uniform
Consumer Credit Code under the authority of Section
70B-5-105, U.C.A., 1953, as amended.
If the funds in the account are found to belong to Griffith,
Dresser's affidavit for garnishment must be found to have been
false.

Dresser employed the wrong garnishment form and should be

limited to whatever portion of the funds may be garnished under
the above quoted provisions, as reflected in the garnishee
interrogatories and instructions on the garnishment form Dresser
should have used, but did not.

CONCLUSION
This Court should order release of Dresser's garnishment based
on this Court's opinion in the Peterson case.

There is clear and

convincing evidence in the record that the funds in question were
corporate funds, not the judgment debtor's.
Because Griffith had informed CSB representative of Modern
Equipment's incorporation at the time of such incorporation, CSB
should be estopped to assert in its garnishee interrogatory
answers that the funds in the Modern Equipment account belonged to
Griffith.
The doctrines of equitable, promissory or judicial estoppel
-19-

should be invoked to preclude Dresser from garnishing the subject
funds*

Griffith reasonably relied on the indication of one of

Dresser's attorneys that collection efforts would be held in
abeyance pending commitment to a proposed payment arrangement.
Dresser's surprise garnishment and its commission of other
post-judgment debt collection improprieties should not be
countenanced.
If Dresser is entitled to attach any of the funds in the
account, it should be limited to the funds in the account at the
time of incoporation—$3,669.59.

Because such funds were

"earnings" from Griffith's services, Dresser should be further
] imited to attachment of that portion of such funds allowed under
Rule 64D(e)(v).
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 18 day of March, 1987.

Douglars G. Mortecfsen
MATHESON, JEPPSON & MORTENSEN
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DRESSER CRANE & HOIST,

ORDER DENYING MOTION
TO SET ASIDE GARNISHMENT
AND GARNISHEE JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

Civil No. C 86-4056
Judge James S. Sawaya

vs.
ALAN GRIFFITH dba MODERN
EQUIPMENT CO.,
Defendant.

On October 27, 1986, the Honorable James S. Sawaya agreed to
review the Memoranda submitted by the parties in connection with
defendant's
Judgment.

Motion

to

Set

Aside

Garnishment

and

Garnishee

Plaintiff appeared through its counsel, Stephen B.

Elggren of Elggren and Van Dyke and defendant appeared through
its counsel, Douglas Mortensen.
The Court, having read and reviewed the Memoranda, made its
findings that defendant had submitted no proof that the funds
garnished

by plaintiff were generated by nor payable to the

corporation.

In particular, the Court made its finding that:

The facts of the Peterson case and the present case are
distinguishable in that there is no proof that the funds
in the present case were generated by nor payable to the
corporation. Based thereon, the Court affirms its
previous decision. Additionally, the Court does not find
merit in the defendant's estoppel argument.
Rased

thereon

affirming

the Court made

its Minute

Entry and

its prior decision not to set aside said

decision
Garnishee

Judgment,

and good c a u s e t h e r e f o r e

IT I S HEREBY ORDERED t h a t
said

Garnishee

estopoel

Judgment

argument

DATED t h i s

is

appearing,

defendant's

hereby

denied

Motion
and

to Set

that

Aside

defendants

i s without^ m e r i t .

/ —day of .Mouarobejc,

1986.

Approved a s . t o i o n n ;
D o u g l a s &• M o ^ t e n s e n

ATTEST
H. D'XCN ,-ei. " • ~y

k^opUtV C'c^TK

GGC^.14
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Things did not go right in this case.
Allred moved and filed a change of address
with the post office. On July 26, 1974, the
Denisons were involved in an automobile
collision with an uninsured motorist. On
August 21, 1974, Allred received a number
of mail packages from the post office, including the request for insurance mailed by
Crown, together with its check dated June
13, 1974. There is no explanation as to why
the mail was held by the postal workers for
such a long period of time.
Insurance Company refused to issue its
policy on the wrecked car. Denisons filed
suit against Crown, Allred, and Insurance
Company, Crown cross-complained against
Allred and Insurance Company.
Allred and Insurance Company answered
the cross-complaint. They further crosscomplained against each other and each replied thereto. Crown then moved for summary judgment against the Denisons, which
motion was denied. Allred and Insurance
Company filed motions for summary judgment against Crown's third-party complaint. The trial court granted these motions and dismissed the third-party complaint with prejudice. Crown has appealed
the ruling of the trial court made on these
motions for summary judgment.
The order denying Crown's motion for
summary judgment against the Denisons is
not a final order, and since the main case is
still pending, the granting of the summary
judgments in favor of the cross-defendants
could be reviewed on appeal when the case
is finally disposed of. If Crown wins in the
main action, the cross-claim would be without merit for Crown only seeks to be reimbursed in case the Denisons prevail in the
main action. If the Denisons win their
action against Crown, then Crown and the
cross-defendants can try out their issues
and will not clutter up the principal issues
involved in the original action.
The appeal by Crown from the denial of
its motion for summary judgment is dismissed because it is not from a final order.
Its appeal from the order granting the motions of Allred and Insurance Company is
likewise dismissed without prejudice to re-

new it if, and when, the Denisons recover a
judgment against Crown. Costs are awarded to Denisons, Allred, and Insurance Company.
CROCKETT, MAUGHAN and WILKINS, JJ.y and F. HENRI HENROID, Justice Retired, concur.
HALL, J., having disqualified
does not participate herein.

fa

himself
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Patricia PETERSON, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
John S. PETERSON, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 15091.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 10, 1977.

A divorced wife appealed from an order of the Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Dean E. Condor, J., setting aside a
garnishment execution and releasing funds
deposited in a checking account held in the
sole name of her former husband in a proceeding for delinquent child support. The
Supreme Court, Wilkins, J., held that the
husband had discharged his burden of showing that the funds in the garnished account
were those of his second wife.
Affirmed.
Ellett, (\ J., dissented and filed opinion.
Crockett, J., dissented and filed opinion
in which Ellett, C. J., joined.

i. Husband and Wife c=>ti8
Common-law doctrine concerning incapacity of married women to hold property

PETERSON . PETERSON
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in their own name and holding that woman's personal property vests in her husband
absolutely has never been recognized in
Utah and was abrogated by statute even
before Utah was admitted into statehood.
U.C.A.1953, 30-2-1 to 30-2-10, 30-2-5.
2. Garnishment c=»62
Funds in joint account are not subject
to garnishment by judgment creditor of one
holder of such account if such judgment
debtor has no equitable interest in funds on
deposit.
3. Garnishment o=»194
Party moving to dismiss or quash garnishment proceedings has burden of proof.
4. Divorce e=>311
In garnishment proceedings brought by
his ex-wife for satisfaction of judgment for
delinquent child support, husband discharged burden of proving that funds in
account in his name were those of his
second wife when he showed that he had
not worked for over one year, that funds in
account were almost exclusively derived
from paychecks of second wife, that checks
were routinely endorsed to husband by
second wife and deposited by him, and that,
although husband deposited some funds in
account, they amounted to less than amount
paid from account toward husband's child
support payments to former wife.

tion of a judgment for delinquent child
support. Affirmed. Costs to defendant.
At the hearing on defendant's motion to
set aside the garnishment execution, the
evidence demonstrated that the garnished
account was held in defendant's name; that
only his name was on the bank's signature
card and, therefore, only he was authorized
to write checks against the account. However, defendant had not worked for over a
year, and the funds in the account were
almost exclusively derived from the paychecks of defendant's present wife; and
these checks were routinely endorsed to the
defendant by her and deposited by him.
During the course of the year, defendant
did deposit some of his funds in the account,
but they amounted to less than $1,000. The
money in the account was used for defendant's child support payments to plaintiff,
totaling $1,200, as well as for the general
living expenses of defendant and his wife.
The defendant and his wife each considered
the money in the account to be the wife's
money though the defendant withdrew for
his personal obligations more than he contributed to the account. On the basis of
these facts, the District Court found that
none of the money belonged to the defendant and all of the funds remaining in the
account belonged to defendant's wife, and
were not subject to garnishment for the
defendant's debts.

WILKINS, Justice:
Plaintiff appeals from an order of the
Third District Court for Salt Lake County
setting aside a garnishment execution and
releasing funds deposited in a checking
account held in the sole name of defendant
at First Security Bank in Salt Lake City,
which had been garnished by plaintiff, former wife of defendant, in partial satisfae-

[1] Plaintiff asserts that the evidence
shows that the defendant reduced his
present wife's property to his possession,
and it is therefore attachable by his creditors. This argument appears to be based on
that part of the common law doctrine concerning the incapacity of married women to
hold property in their own name which held
that a woman's personal property vested in
her husband absolutely.1 The common law
concerning the incapacity of a married
woman to hold property has never been
recognized in this jurisdiction, and was abrogated by statute even before Utah was
admitted to statehood.2 A wife's property

1. See 41 C J S. Husband and Wife, Sec. 24 and
38 C.J.S Garnishment, Sec. 79

2. See present Sees 30 2 1 through 30 2 10,
Utah Code Ann. 1953. These statutes have

John L. McCoy of Ryberg & McCoy, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
Robert VanSciver, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and respondent.
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is not attachable for her husband's separate
debts, 3 and therefore plaintiff's argument is
without merit.

ant as movant to be by clear and convincing
evidence.
This Court in Beehive, supra, stated:
If the contract between the parties ostensibly creates a joint tenancy relationship with full right of survivorship, there
arises a presumption that such is the case
unless and until some interested party
shows under equitable rules that the contract should be reformed to show some
other agreement of the parties or that
the contract is not enforceable because of
fraud, mistake, incapacity, or other infirmity. At p. 22, 439 P.2d at p. 471.

Plaintiff argues that defendant has not
presented clear and convincing evidence
sufficient to overcome the presumption that
the funds belong to the defendant, in whose
name they are held, and cites Beehive State
Bank v. Rosquist, 21 Utah 2d 17, 439 P.2d
468 (1968), to support her position. Both
plaintiff and defendant cite many cases
which, like Beehive concern joint tenancy
bank accounts.
Though this case does not pertain to this
type of account, still there is a sufficient
analog between joint tenancy accounts and
the account in this case to pursue an analysis urged upon us by plaintiff.
There is no written document in the record on appeal between the defendant and
his bank to review but rather an oral stipulation between the parties that "the
account is in his (defendant's) name. He
wrote the checks, and that he (sic) is the
only name on the signature card." However the compelling inference from that
stipulation with nothing else, is that defendant owned or had an interest in the
subject funds. Of course', the statement of
facts in this case, ante, shows that this
stipulation is but one of several facts and is
lingular in sustaining plaintiff's contention
of defendant's ownership of the funds.
[2] We did hold in 3eehi\e that the
funds in an account are not subject to garnishment by a judgment creditor of one of
the holders of a joint account if the judgment debtor has no equitable interest in the
funds on deposit, and noted the many jurisdictions in accord with this rule. 4
[3] The party mo\ing to dismiss or
quash garnishment proceedings has the burden of proof. 38 C.J S. Garnishment, Sec.
272(c). And plaintiff urges, as noted, that
that proof must be established by defendremained substantialh unchanged bince 1898,
when first passed by the Legislature sitting in
Utah as a State, and have their inception in
Terntonal laws See 2 Comp Laws 1888, Sees
2528 and 2640

McCormick on Evidence, 2nd ed.; Sec.
340 asserts:
Among the classes of cases to which
this special standard of persuasion (clear
and convincing proof) has been applied
are the following: (1) charges of fraud,
and undue influence, (2) suits on oral
contracts to make a will, and suits to
establish the terms of a lost will, (3) suits
for the specific performance of an oral
contract, (4) proceedings to set aside, reform or modify written transactions or
official acts on grounds of fraud, mistake
or incompleteness, and (5) miscellaneous
types of claims and defenses, varying
from state to state, where there is
thought to be special danger of deception,
or where the court considers that the
particular type of claim should be disfavored on policy grounds.
[4] We agree with plaintiff that persuasion by defendant of a clear and convincing
nature is required in this matter, believing
that there is a "special danger of deception"
in cases such as this one but hold that the
defendant sustained that burden and the
evidence below was sufficient to support
the Court's finding, especially in view of the
fact that both defendant and his present
wife testified that defendant had not been
working and earning money for a year be3.
4.

Sec. 30-2 5, Utah Code Ann 1953
See also 30 Am Jur , Executions, Section 104
and the cases cited therein, and Rule 64D, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure
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cause of his medical problems and plaintiff
presented no evidence to rebut that testimony.
MAUGHAN and HALL, JJ., concur.
ELLETT, Chief Justice (dissenting):
This case does not involve any law relating to joint tenancy. It is a case of gift,
pure and simple. If it be true that the
second wife earned a part or all of the
funds in the bank, it does not matter. Had
she been a rich woman and given her husband the money, there would exist the same
identical relationship between her and the
account as would have existed if she had
earned it.
When she turned the money over to her
husband to go into his sole bank account,
she completely divested herself thereof.
He could have bought a car or gambled it
away and she would have been helpless to
prevent either activity. There was no trust
involved, and I think the garnishment was
legal.
ELLETT, C. J., also concurs in the dissenting opinion of CROCKETT, J.
CROCKETT, Justice (dissenting):
Just as real property is presumed to belong to the person who holds title, the money in a bank account is presumed to belong
to the person in whose name it stands; 1
and for several reasons, including the fact
that such a document or record of title
represents to the world what the ownership
is, the lawr regards them as having considerable sanctity, and they are not to be lightly
disturbed.
Of course, it is not to be doubted that in
exigent circumstances w here by reason of
fraud, mutual mistake of fact or for some
1. First National Bank ot Portland \ Connolh,
172 Or 434, 138 P 2d 613 (1943), Taliaferro v
Reirdon, 186 Okl 607 99 P 2d 500, 9 C J S
Banks and Banking, ^^ 285 and 327
2.

Child v Child, 8 Utah 2d 261, 332 P 2d 981
(1958), Morthcrest. Inc v Walker Bank &
Trust Co, 122 Utah 268, 248 P 2d 692 (1952),
Greener v Gieenei, 116 Utah 571, 212 P 2d 194
(1949)

other consideration of that character, equity and good conscience and the ends of
justice require, other ownership may be recognized. However, it is obvious that if such
ownership can be kept secret in the minds
of the parties dealing with and seeking to
protect the property, the door is open to
duplicity and chicanery. For this reason
the rule is well established that such reformation can be made only upon clear, convincing and persuasive evidence. 2 Specifically with respect to bank accounts, this
Court has repeatedly held that the rights
therein will be presumed to be as stated
unless it is shown by clear and convincing
evidence that the parties intended otherwise.3 No less a standard of proof should
be required when a bank account in a husband's name alone is claimed to be the sole
property of the wife.
The defendant John S. Peterson and his
present wife have it in their power to engage in deception and collusion to cheat his
children by his prior marriage of their right
to support money. Great caution should be
observed to circumvent any such purpose.
It also should be said that their testimony
should be scrutinized with great caution
because of their own self-interest; 4 and it
should be realized that the plaintiff was at
a disadvantage to ferret out and refute
claims that they made as to their private
arrangements as to this bank account. It is
not indicated that the trial judge took into
consideration the matters I have just discussed; nor did he indicate that the finding
that the money did not in fact belong to
defendant John S. Peterson was made on
clear and convincing evidence.
For the reason above stated, I do not
believe that the judgment vacating the garnishment rests upon a sound foundation and
would reverse it.
3. See Beehive State Bank v. Rosqiust, 21 Utah
2d 17, 439 P2d 468 (1968) and cases cited
therein
4. Jensen \ Lof*<in Cit\, 96 Utah 522, 88 P 2d
459 (1939), Mooie v Prudential
Insurance
Compan\ ot America, 26 Utah 2d 430, 491 P 2d
227 (1971)

